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D I A L O G U E
Animal Law and Environmental 
Law: Exploring the 
Connections and Synergies
Summary
Environmental law, with its intricate layers of inter-
national, federal, state, and local laws, is more estab-
lished than its animal counterpart . Yet animal law 
faces many of the same legal and strategic challenges 
that environmental law faced in seeking to establish 
a more secure foothold, both in the United States 
and abroad . In What Can Animal Law Learn From 
Environmental Law?, editor Randall S . Abate brought 
together academics, advocates, and legal profession-
als to examine the very different histories of environ-
mental and animal law, as well as the legal and policy 
frameworks that bridge the two fields . On November 
16, 2015, the Environmental Law Institute held a Dia-
logue about these critical issues . Drawing on lessons 
from history, politics, and law, the panelists examined 
how environmental law’s successes and shortcomings 
can inform animal law and how the two fields can 
work together for mutual gain in the future . They also 
explored important intersections between the two 
fields, such as concentrated animal feeding operations, 
agriculture and climate change, the legal valuation of 
nature, and other critical topics . Below we present a 
transcript of the discussion, which has been edited for 
style, clarity, and space considerations .
Randall S. Abate (moderator) is Professor of Law, Direc-
tor of the Center for International Law and Justice, and 
Project Director of the Environment, Development & Jus-
tice Program at Florida A&M College of Law, and Editor 
of What Can Animal Law Learn From Environmental Law?
Elizabeth Hallinan is an animal law attorney and consul-
tant, previously with the Animal Legal Defense Fund and 
Compassion Over Killing .
Joan E. Schaffner is Associate Professor of Law at The 
George Washington University Law School .
Bruce Myers is a public interest animal and environmen-
tal lawyer based in Washington, D .C ., previously a Senior 
Attorney at the Environmental Law Institute .
Randall Abate: Three of the fantastic contributing authors 
for What Can Animal Law Learn From Environmental 
Law?1 are with us here today on this panel . It was a true 
labor of love putting this book together . As someone com-
ing from the environmental law field for two decades and 
only recently transitioning to animal law, working on this 
book project was an exciting learning process for me and it 
provided an opportunity to engage with some of the lead-
ing academics and practitioners and emerging voices in 
both animal law and environmental law .
The panel will hit some of the highlights of the book . I 
want to provide a very general overview of what the book 
tries to achieve . Primarily, there are two goals . The first 
goal is reflected in the title’s reference to environmental 
law, which, as a much more established field than animal 
law, has faced and overcome many challenges as a growing 
field in the law . Animal law is facing many of those same 
challenges as it seeks to emerge as an established field of 
law . There are many valuable lessons that environmental 
law can offer to animal law in moving forward .
The second objective is a practical emphasis on explor-
ing ways in which there are synergies between these two 
fields so that there can be common ground for these fields 
to secure mutual gain by finding opportunities to work 
together on issues of common concern . Examples of com-
mon concerns are food law and policy and climate change 
law and policy . These are the most significant areas for 
animal law and environmental law to potentially work 
together and secure valuable mutual benefit .
One topic that we’re not going to be able to get into in 
much detail (but is critical to the book) involves the inter-
national and comparative law dimensions of this topic . 
First, there are many countries pursuing progressive initia-
tives on topics relevant to animal law, from which U .S . 
animal law can learn . Second, international environmen-
tal law has secured a very strong place over the past few 
decades, while animal law isn’t nearly there in establishing 
a global presence under the law . So, there’s a lot that ani-
mal law can learn regarding how the field can achieve an 
impact under international law .
Primarily, the focus for today will be three discussions 
within the broader framework of the connection between 
the fields . We’re going to hear first from Liz Hallinan, an 
1 . What Can Animal Law Learn From Environmental Law? (Randall S . 
Abate ed ., ELI Press 2015) .
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environmental lawyer and an animal lawyer, regarding 
some dimensions of history and politics and law as ways 
that environmental law may have paved the way for ani-
mal law to grow . Then Prof . Joan Schaffner of The George 
Washington University Law School will discuss how envi-
ronmental law has had a firm foundation in the notion of 
valuation of damages on an intrinsic value basis and how 
that’s something that can be quite valuable as a foundation 
for animal law, which currently recognizes merely market or 
replacement value damages for animals . Third, we will hear 
from Bruce Myers, a Senior Attorney here at ELI, who co-
authored a chapter with an individual who’s fondly known 
as the mother of animal law, Joyce Tischler . Bruce will be 
discussing methods and opportunities to move forward 
with animal law and environmental law working together .
Liz Hallinan: When I was a 2L in law school taking envi-
ronmental law, we covered the Clean Air Act (CAA) .2 I 
remember my professor saying something that really struck 
me at the time, which was that the automotive industry 
had supported the passage of the 1970 CAA . As an animal 
advocate, it blew my mind that an industry might actually 
support federal regulation of its own activities, and I stored 
that little nugget away . I always wanted to delve into the 
story and find out how that happened, because I think if 
we can figure out how to get industry to support regulation 
of itself, we can make strides in animal law in a way that 
we’re not even close to doing yet . That’s what I’m going to 
talk about today .
I’m going to give you a very brief history of the CAA 
and focus on how industry came to support the regulation 
on its own initiative . I’m going to talk about the lessons 
we can take from that story, and then I’m going to apply it 
to two different areas: how we can use this to help farmed 
animals, and how we can use it to help circus elephants . 
My discussion of the statute will have to be vastly oversim-
plified . I recommend that if you’re interested in the history 
of air pollution control in this country, read a book called 
Pollution and Policy,3 which will give you more information 
than you ever wanted to know .
Air pollution had been an issue for several decades at the 
beginning of the 20th century . But the move to regulate 
air pollution really coalesced in California by mid-century, 
because southern California in particular was having such 
difficulty with their visible air pollution . California did 
what you might expect a state would do . It started by estab-
lishing standards, but made the implementation of those 
standards voluntary . Several counties decided not to regu-
late, which didn’t help the counties that were regulating 
because pollution does not stay within county boundaries .
By 1960, California was feeling the pressure to do some-
thing more, so it set mandatory air quality standards . In 
particular, it set technology standards for cars . California 
2 . 42 U .S .C . §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat . CAA §§101-618 .
3 . James E . Krier & Edmund Ursin, Pollution and Policy: A Case Es-
say on California and Federal Experience With Motor Vehicle Air 
Pollution, 1940-1978 (Univ . Cal . Press 1977) .
figured out early that cars were one of the major contribu-
tors to pollution . I think it is important to realize that the 
automotive manufacturing industry has never been based 
in California; it’s been based in Michigan . As you can 
imagine, it’s much more tempting for state politicians to 
regulate industries that are not in their own state because 
then they can look like a champion of their citizens with-
out hampering any in-state industries . We’ll come back to 
this point later .
By 1965, California wasn’t the only state trying to reg-
ulate air pollution . New York and Pennsylvania had also 
either proposed or passed emission standards . New York’s 
standards were actually more strict than what California 
had passed . The federal government for the first couple of 
decades took the position that air pollution was a local prob-
lem and therefore it was not the federal government’s role to 
regulate it . The federal government decided that its role was 
limited to providing research and perhaps policy guidelines .
But then we get to 1965, and several states, not only 
California, are regulating air pollution . The automotive 
industry sees the writing on the wall . What they are wor-
ried about is not just that California is setting certain stan-
dards, but that New York and Pennsylvania are also doing 
so, with different requirements . Think about being a car 
manufacturer at this point in history . You make cars in 
Michigan . You do not want to make one car for New York, 
another car for California, and another car for Pennsyl-
vania . So, although the car industry would rather not be 
regulated at all, what they don’t want most of all is to have 
inconsistent state standards, where they have to make dif-
ferent cars for different states .
So, the industry went to the U .S . Congress and said 
we’re okay if you regulate us, but we want one standard, a 
federal standard that applies to the entire country, because 
we’d rather have one consistent standard than have to meet 
all of these different state standards . Also, the industry 
probably felt that it could better control federal standards 
because they have powerful lobbyists at the national level .
In 1965, with the support of President Lyndon Johnson, 
Congress passed the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control 
Act4 of 1965, which set vehicle emission standards . Cali-
fornia wasn’t happy about this because California did not 
want a federal law that preempted the state’s own standards . 
Remember, southern California has a particularly bad pol-
lution problem . The California congressional delegation 
tried to ensure that the state standards would be exempted 
from the federal standards, so that the state could keep 
ratcheting up the pollution control if they wanted to with-
out being hampered by the federal standards .
The car industry resisted the California delegation’s 
approach because the whole reason the industry went to 
Congress was to ensure a consistent standard across the 
country . The result was a battle between those two groups . 
California won and kept its exemptions, thereby enabling 
it to set higher standards than the national standard .
4 . Pub . L . No . 89-272 (1965) .
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This was great progress, but 1969 really represents “the 
year of the environment .” There was a big push to have 
massive federal environmental regulation in 1969 . The car 
industry’s reputation was at absolute rock bottom . They 
were being investigated on an anti-trust charge; Ralph 
Nader’s group had gone after them; and there was some 
evidence that the industry had been pressuring the states 
for a race to the bottom, that is, that they were pushing 
some states to engage in as little regulation as possible .
Then in stepped two champions of the environment, 
one obvious champion and one very non-obvious one . Sen . 
Edmund Muskie (D-Me .) decided that he was going to be 
the champion of the environment, pushing for the stron-
gest federal regulations possible . But President Richard 
Nixon (surprisingly to my generation) didn’t want to be 
outdone on the environment . While Congress was writ-
ing the 1970 CAA, each politician kept one-upping the 
other on how strict they could be . Senator Muskie would 
propose one version of federal regulation and Nixon would 
come back and propose something more strict . As of result 
of the one-upping, we got this amazing environmental 
regulation that not only set emission standards for cars and 
for other things, but also provided in the statute that you 
couldn’t take into consideration costs to the industry or car 
technology and availability when setting standards .
We ended up with what I think is quite an incredible 
law for its time, the 1970 CAA . At the end of the day, 
industry still lost out because California was allowed to 
keep its key exemption, enabling it to set higher standards 
than the rest of the country if it feels that it needs to .
Why do I think this is an interesting story? There are 
several lessons we can take from it . One is that you should 
start local if possible because often advocates for change, 
particularly animal advocates, have more power at the 
local or state level than at the federal level . What the CAA 
story tells us is that even local initiatives can move progress 
significantly, even if your goal ultimately is to reach the 
national level .
Another part of the story is that if you start local, it’s 
helpful if the industry that you are opposing is based out of 
state, because it is much easier to convince local politicians 
to impose costs on industries that are not located within 
their own state . If you can get several local or state legisla-
tive initiatives going, that can really help build momen-
tum . Once you get one locality to pass laws, you can get 
other localities to jump on board . It is much harder just to 
go straight to Congress to get this stuff done .
So, the CAA story would suggest that once you get a 
couple of legislative pieces in place at the local or state level, 
industry is then going to be driven to lobby for a national 
solution . This is because they would rather have a single 
(and preferably lower) federal standard than have to deal 
with inconsistent state standards . This strategy has been 
labeled by some scholars as the Defensive Preemption The-
ory, in that industry would be attempting to defensively 
preempt state or local standards .5 The theory is particularly 
relevant if the manufacturing industry is centralized in 
one location or otherwise standardized, such as in the car 
manufacturing case . We make the same car for every state; 
so if you have differing state standards, centralized manu-
facturing is going to be particularly vulnerable to different 
state standards calling for differing products .
And then of course (tongue in cheek) the easiest part 
is to convince national politicians that your agenda is the 
most important one and that they should stake their politi-
cal career on what you want to happen .
I used to be a scientist; so now, we’re going to test this 
theory on two different areas in animal law . First, farmed 
animals: The current state of farmed animal regulation is 
very similar to where pollution control was in the 1960s, 
which is to say that several states have started to regulate 
how farmed animals are treated on the farm, but there is no 
federal legislation on point . Several states have banned ges-
tation crates for pigs (where a pregnant pig is put in a very 
tiny cage so that she cannot turn around); banned battery 
cages for egg-laying hens (where 4-10 hens are kept in cages 
about the size of a file drawer); and banned veal crates . A 
few states have banned tail docking for dairy cows .
Now, you can see that farmed animal regulation is fol-
lowing the pattern of the CAA story . The first states to have 
banned these production methods for farmed animals tend 
to be states with almost no agricultural base . For example, 
the first sow gestation crate ban was in Florida, where I 
think they had two pig farms . This pattern of regulation is 
known as cost externalization . If you don’t have a big agri-
cultural industry in your state, it’s much easier to regulate 
that industry without much pushback .
The one exception to this rule for farmed animal cost 
externalization has been California . California is in fact 
quite a large agricultural state . However, in 2008, a ballot 
initiative called Proposition 2 in California banned gesta-
tion crates, battery cages, and veal crates . This initiative 
came directly from the voters, which I think is one reason 
it passed . Once these bans passed in California, the Cali-
fornia Legislature then additionally banned several of the 
products coming out of these production methods . The 
state now bans the sale of eggs that come from battery 
cages, and the production and sale of foie gras . So, now 
in California, we see product regulation, not just produc-
tion regulation .
What would the Defensive Preemption Theory predict 
next for farmed animals? Well, now that we’ve gotten a 
couple of states to regulate farmed animals’ treatment, you 
might expect that the farmed animal industry would now 
lobby Congress to try to get national regulation that is less 
strict, so that the industry will only have to deal with one 
lower standard .
In fact, a couple of years ago, the United Egg Produc-
ers (the industry group representing egg farmers) and the 
Humane Society of the United States (a nongovernmen-
5 . See, e.g ., J .R . DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regula-
tion: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U . Pa . L . Rev . 1499, 1500 (2007) .
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tal organization) got together and agreed that they would 
together lobby for federal legislation on how egg-laying 
hens could be housed and treated on a farm . Not much 
has come out of that so far, but that type of cooperative 
development is exactly what the Defensive Preemption 
Theory would predict: The United Egg Producers decided 
they were worried about inconsistent state standards and 
preferred that Congress step in and give the industry one 
national standard with which to comply .
There are various reasons why we haven’t seen more of 
this national lobbying and legislation for farmed animals, 
but basically the Commerce Clause and preemption issues 
pose problems for getting more state legislation on these 
issues (see the book chapter for an in-depth explanation of 
these barriers) . However, I think that what we’ve seen so far 
is a good first step to getting to the national level .
The second subject I want to test the Defensive Preemp-
tion Theory on is circus elephants . One of the main con-
cerns we have with circus elephants is the use of something 
called the bullhook . It’s basically a wooden baton with 
a metal hook on the end . The elephant handler hooks it 
into soft tissue or skin, such as behind the ears or behind 
the legs of the elephant . That’s painful to the elephant, so 
they’ll do what the handler tells them to do . It’s a very cruel 
method of training elephants .
The situation for circus elephants right now is slightly 
different than it was for air pollution in the 1960s because 
there are existing federal laws that should protect elephants 
and should in theory prohibit the use of these bullhooks . 
The Endangered Species Act (ESA)6 and the Animal Wel-
fare Act7 both require that elephants be treated in humane 
ways . The problem is that the bullhook is still in use all 
over the country and there’s very little enforcement of 
these laws . Litigants have tried to use the ESA to obtain 
a judicial ban on bullhooks, but various procedural issues 
have prevented them from doing so . The lack of protective 
enforcement from existing federal laws is unforgivable .
There is also an argument that state anti-cruelty laws 
technically prohibit use of bullhooks on elephants . But 
again, efforts to use those laws for that purpose haven’t 
been successful . So recently, animal advocates have decided 
to go even more local . Advocates have started to get local 
ordinances passed specifically mentioning the bullhook 
and banning its use in any way . The first ordinance passed 
was in Fulton County, Georgia, followed by small towns 
in Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, and Oregon . This develop-
ment fits the pattern we saw with the CAA, in that small 
counties took it upon themselves to make local laws ban-
ning a specific practice . Generally, these counties are places 
where the circus didn’t conduct animal training or even 
visit, so it was easy to get local politicians on board .
The real turning point came when Los Angeles banned 
the bullhook a couple of years ago . It was a turning point 
because Los Angeles is a big city where circuses, particu-
larly Ringling Brothers, visit several times every year . If 
6 . 16 U .S .C . §§1531-1544, ELR Stat . ESA §§2-18 .
7 . 7 U .S .C . §§2131 et seq .
Ringling can’t use the bullhook in Los Angeles, then they 
can’t even bring their elephants to the city at all . That’s an 
entire city that’s off Ringling’s tour schedule . Quickly fol-
lowing Los Angeles, Oakland banned the bullhook for the 
same reason . Once Los Angeles took action, other cities 
suddenly were open to the idea of banning the bullhook .
So, this was the state of the law when Jeffrey Pierce and I 
were writing the chapter for Randy’s book . But, I remember 
waking up one day during that time and my e-mail inbox 
was just blowing up because Ringling had announced in 
March that they were eliminating elephants from all of 
their shows . We had been wondering if Ringling intended 
to go to Congress to try to get the federal government to 
do something about these bullhook bans . But it turned out 
that Ringling just skipped over that entire step . Ringling 
said that (among other reasons) because there were incon-
sistent local ordinances regarding bullhook use that were 
wreaking havoc for their tour schedule, they were just going 
to take elephants out of their shows altogether . As a scien-
tist, I thought, “yes, my data worked!” Ringling’s action was 
another way of going for a national solution, even though it 
wasn’t through federal legislation, because the inconsistent 
local standards were infeasible for them to follow .
These stories help pave a way for animal advocates to 
approach a situation in which national legislation seems 
infeasible and unreachable . We can use this template to 
say: We start here . We can pressure industry to actually 
end up supporting the kind of regulation that we’ve been 
fighting for all along . So, there’s hope .
Joan Schaffner: When Randy asked me to contribute to 
the book, I was a bit skeptical . As one primarily involved 
in animal law, I particularly am interested in exploring the 
legal rights and protections for individual animals . My 
view of the environmental law approach was that it pro-
tects species only when they’re near extinction rather than 
focusing on the protection of individual wildlife . However, 
I soon realized that the debate within environmental law to 
valuing nature and the approach to natural resource dam-
ages, both theoretically and in practice, is something from 
which animal law can learn quite a lot .
We respect and protect that which we value . Thus, the 
values that we place on nature and domestic animals are 
critical to their protection under the law . A key area of 
debate in the animal law context concerns what compen-
satory damages are available to an owner for the loss of a 
companion animal caused by the wrongdoing of another 
person . Specifically, whether the law will recognize the 
noneconomic (in other words, companionship) value of 
the animal to the owner and compensate for that loss . 
Although there has been some progress, generally courts 
and legislatures, viewing animals as personal property, 
limit damages to the economic value of the animal .
This debate has occurred largely in isolation from envi-
ronmental law, with its arguably more progressive theories 
and approaches to natural resource damages having little 
influence in the animal law debate . Although the two 
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regimes are quite distinct legally and socially, I believe that 
the environmental law approach to the valuation of natu-
ral resource damages may inform the animal law debate 
over the valuation of animals and damages awarded when 
they are harmed, and perhaps may even support recogniz-
ing not only the noneconomic companionship value of 
companion animals to their owners, but also the intrinsic 
value of all animals .
Why is valuation and its relationship to damages or 
sanctions important to the protection of individual ani-
mal well-being? Because legislation that regulates conduct 
affecting both the environment and animals’ lives and sets 
sanctions for their violation generally is the result of utili-
tarian balancing of the costs and benefits of such conduct . 
In order to provide adequate protection, this balancing 
must properly reflect the value of nature and animals’ lives 
and the cost to them when harmed . Judicially, the same 
balancing occurs when setting common-law standards of 
care and the damages imposed for their violation .
Thus, the level of incentive to comply with the legal 
standard primarily is a function of the damages that are 
imposed when the standards are enforced . Accordingly, to 
properly set incentives to comply with legal standards and 
to avoid harm to both nature and animals, the damages 
imposed for their loss must reflect their proper value . My 
thesis is that theories of valuing nature under environmen-
tal law can provide an analog for animal law and a basis for 
granting damages that will properly reflect the true value 
of animals .
To present my thesis today, I’ll provide a very brief 
introduction to damages, then turn to environmental 
law theories on both identifying and quantifying nature’s 
anthropocentric and biocentric values . Then, I’ll turn to 
the animal-law debate over companion animal damages 
and demonstrate how lessons learned from environmental 
law may be used to rebut the arguments against allowing 
damages for noneconomic companionship value and sup-
port the recovery of such damages . And then, finally, I will 
end with a suggestion that the next step in the animal-
law debate, informed by environmental law, should be to 
include damages for the intrinsic value of all animals in 
order to better protect their interests .
Damages are divided into three types: compensatory, 
restitutionary, and punitive . Each type serves a different 
function and thus is assessed differently . Compensatory 
damages are designed to make the victim whole and to 
regulate our daily affairs, and thus are assessed based on 
the harm suffered by the victim . Restitutionary damages 
serve to disgorge from the wrongdoer any profit realized 
by their wrong and thus are assessed based on the profit 
gained by the wrongdoer . Punitive damages are designed 
to punish and deter intentional and malicious conduct 
and are assessed based on how egregious the defendant’s 
conduct is . My discussion focuses on compensatory dam-
ages because the purpose is both to accurately compensate 
the victim, whether the victim be society or the owner, for 
their loss to either nature or their individual animal, and 
perhaps, more importantly, to set proper incentives to take 
care and avoid harm to nature and animals .
Environmental law recognizes that nature has both 
anthropocentric and biocentric values . Anthropocentric 
values are characterized by both the use and existence values 
of nature to human beings . Biocentric value is the intrin-
sic value of nature independent of its utility to humans . 
Anthropocentric use value is reflected by humans’ behav-
ior and may be economic and noneconomic, consumptive 
and nonconsumptive . For example, cutting down trees for 
lumber represents a consumptive economic use value of the 
trees to the lumber company . In contrast, whale-watching 
is a nonconsumptive use that has both an economic value 
to the whale-watching company and a noneconomic value 
to the individuals enjoying the whales .
Anthropocentric existence value is reflected attitudi-
nally because it relates to future and potential use . Exis-
tence value is divided into three types: option, vicarious, 
and intertemporal . Option value depicts our interest in 
preserving nature for our future use . Vicarious value 
describes our interest in preserving nature from extinction 
independent of our potential future use . Intertemporal 
value denotes our interest in preserving nature for future 
generations . The Wilderness Act8 of 1964 exemplifies Con-
gress’ interest in preserving and protecting the various exis-
tence values of nature by designating the “preservation and 
protection [of designated wilderness areas] in their natural 
condition  .  .  . to secure for the American people of present 
and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource 
of wilderness .”9
Biocentric value reflects an appreciation that all living 
things have inherent value and moral significance indepen-
dent of their use by human beings . Assessing biocentric 
value is controversial because its measure is predicated on 
informed human understanding of that intrinsic value and 
not necessarily on the value itself . Moreover, although some 
might argue that to try to commodify intrinsic value may 
in fact demean such value, I believe it’s still necessary in our 
capitalistic society to at least estimate the intrinsic value of 
nature and assess such damages when nature is harmed . 
Otherwise, the value will be set as zero . There is no regula-
tory incentive to avoid harm to something of zero value .
There are several methods for quantifying nature’s val-
ues . Market value, the price a willing buyer would pay to a 
willing seller, is the most common and least controversial 
method, but it captures only economic use value . Restora-
tion cost does not directly assess value, but rather is based 
on the cost to fully restore the damage done to a natural 
resource . Since the result arguably, or at least theoretically, 
is to return the resource to its original condition, restora-
tion cost arguably reflects all values—economic and non-
economic use, existence, and intrinsic values . However, 
restoration may be impossible . Replacement cost may be 
used instead, the cost to purchase a comparable site . Note, 
it does not address the unique aspect of the natural resource 
8 . 16 U .S .C . §§1131 et seq .
9 . 16 U .S .C . §1131(a) .
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destroyed, nor does it account for the combined loss of the 
damaged site and its replacement .
Behavioral use, specifically travel cost, assesses nature’s 
economic and noneconomic use values by calculating the 
expenses we would incur to travel to and enjoy the natu-
ral resource . Finally, contingent valuation assesses nature’s 
existence and intrinsic values based on a survey of people’s 
responses to questions exploring the values they would 
place on certain natural resources . This method is the 
most controversial for a variety of reasons, including that 
it is attitudinal and often influenced by the survey design 
and execution .
Examples under environmental law—the Fish and 
Wildlife Conservation Act,10 the 1989 D .C . Circuit deci-
sion in Ohio v. Department of the Interior11 that remains 
a landmark decision on the proper methodology for valu-
ing natural resource damages under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA),12 and the revised U .S . Department of the 
Interior CERCLA Damage Assessment Rules13—reflect an 
appreciation of all of nature’s values and a commitment to 
at least attempt to assess damages to compensate for their 
loss . For example, the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act 
expressly recognizes nature’s ecological, educational, aes-
thetic, cultural, recreational, economic, and scientific val-
ues . While these are all anthropocentric, they do reflect 
both economic and noneconomic values to humans .
Also, these statutes, and the court in Ohio, state that 
they appreciate that efficiency in determining the proper 
measurement of damages means determining the chosen 
policy that will achieve the greatest value to society, not 
necessarily the least expensive policy . And because nature 
is not a fungible good, the cost to restore that resource 
may be awarded even if the restoration cost is greater than 
the market value . And finally, they allow for nonmarket 
methods to measure lost value of natural resources to both 
human and non-human services .
How may these lessons inform the animal-law damages 
debate? The traditional rule for compensating lost property 
is to assess damages for the loss based on market value . 
Since owned companion animals are deemed personal 
property under the law, damages for their loss generally are 
based on market value, the cost to purchase the companion 
animal . Companion animals typically have relatively little 
market value because it’s relatively inexpensive to either 
adopt from a shelter or purchase from a pet store . However, 
the owner places great value on their companion animal 
based on the relationship that they develop with the ani-
mal, in other words, the companionship that they share . 
This value, however, is not reflected in market value .
In many jurisdictions, if the companion animal is 
injured but not killed, the owner often cannot even recover 
10 . 16 U .S .C . §§2901-2911 .
11 . 880 F .2d 432, 19 ELR 21099 (D .C . Cir . 1989) .
12 . 42 U .S .C . §§9601-9675, ELR Stat . CERCLA §§101-405 .
13 . 43 C .F .R . pt . 11, Natural Resource Damage Assessments . See also U .S . Fish 
& Wildlife Serv ., The Damage Assessment Process, available at http://www .
fws .gov/policy/nrda-2 .pdf .
the cost of reasonable vet expenses if they exceed the com-
panion animal’s market value . This is an economic disin-
centive for an owner to provide proper veterinary care to 
the companion animal, and arguably is inhumane . While 
some jurisdictions allow recovery of value to the owner, this 
value still only reflects the economic value to the owner, 
not the noneconomic companionship value .
Why is the lost companionship value of the animal to 
the owner not recovered in damages, even though most 
courts and legislatures recognize that companion animals 
actually serve companionship value? There are a variety of 
arguments, but the top three are these: First, it is ineffi-
cient for damages to exceed market value . This argument is 
based on a view that animals are fungible goods . Second, it 
would be anomalous for companion animals with market 
value to be deemed less valuable than companion animals 
with little market value . Third, and perhaps most impor-
tant, the notion is that noneconomic damages are highly 
subjective, speculative, and not capable of measurement . 
Therefore, allowing damages for companionship value will 
result in excessive recovery and be detrimental to society, 
the animals, the animals’ owners, and everyone else .
How might environmental law and the assessment of 
natural resource damages inform this animal law debate 
and its valuation of companion animals to include com-
panionship value in compensatory damages when they 
are lost? I suggest that they provide a basis for challeng-
ing these arguments and assumptions . First, companion 
animals, like nature, are nonfungible goods with noneco-
nomic value . Just as market value undervalues nature, it 
also undervalues companion animals because market value 
reflects only economic use value .
Second, efficiency simply means choosing a policy that 
dictates the greatest value to society—in this context, 
proper compensation to the owner and an incentive to care 
for an injured animal—not the least expensive alternative . 
Just as an accurate assessment of the value of nature and 
natural resource damages includes the sum of economic 
and noneconomic use, existence, and sometimes intrinsic 
value, the proper assessment of damages for loss of a com-
panion animal can include the sum of the economic and 
noneconomic values of the animal to the owner . Thus, no 
anomaly will exist when comparing damages for a com-
panion animal with or without market value . Third, and 
most importantly, natural resource methodologies such as 
restoration or replacement cost, behavioral, and contingent 
valuation may be used to objectively measure lost compan-
ionship value such that the recovery of this value as dam-
ages will not be excessive and detrimental to society .
How might we use these methodologies in this context? 
Restoration cost may be based on the expenses of veteri-
nary services to heal the animal, whether successful or not . 
Behavioral travel cost methodology may be based on the 
average owner’s expense to care for their companion ani-
mal . While companionship reflects a noneconomic bond, 
such bond has a significant economic impact on society . 
It is the primary reason that owners in the United States 
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damages could, for example, provide resources for spay/
neuter services or cruelty investigations in the jurisdiction .
Finally, although quantifying intrinsic value of an ani-
mal is difficult, we could use environmental law’s contin-
gent valuation methodology to provide an estimate of such 
value . To reiterate, we respect and protect that which we 
value . Hopefully, soon we’ll properly value all animals so 
that they may be properly respected and protected under 
the law .
Bruce Myers: I had two terrific co-authors for my two 
chapters . One, as Randy mentioned, is Joyce Tischler, who 
is known as the mother of animal law and is the founder 
and general counsel of Animal Legal Defense Fund . The 
other co-author is my colleague Linda Breggin, a senior 
attorney at the Environmental Law Institute . Linda and I 
worked on a chapter on concentrated animal feeding oper-
ations (CAFOs) and climate change . With Joyce, I worked 
on the chapter on the two movements and the future of 
the intersection of animal law and environmental law . That 
will be my focus here .
One of the first things we wanted to present is the idea 
that animal law and environmental law are not like other 
areas of law . This isn’t contract law . These areas of law grow 
out of movements that have incredible energy and passion . 
I’m stating the obvious, but I think it’s an important point 
in thinking about the law that emerges from these contexts 
and where it might be able to go in the future .
It’s also useful to think of these movements—animal 
protection and environmental protection—as not neces-
sarily consisting of only the nonprofits and other organi-
zations that are associated with them, but really all of the 
people who are members of these organizations—all of the 
people who self-identify with these movements whether 
they work for government or industry or whatever they 
may do in any walk of life .
Something I want to try just as an illustration is to ask 
for a brief show of hands in the room . How many of you 
consider yourself an environmentalist, in whatever sense 
you choose to define the term? And now, how many of you 
view yourself as an animal welfare person, an animal pro-
tectionist? Most people in the room answered yes to both 
of those questions . If you look at a lot of our organizations, 
which all do amazing work, the overlap evidenced by this 
informal poll is usually not represented within the organi-
zations themselves . But you see it more and more among 
individual people .
I’d like to read a few lines about animal protection from 
our chapter . This may be of particular interest to those of 
you who self-identify as an environmentalist, but haven’t 
thought a lot about the animal protection perspective:
The animal protection movement is comprised of people 
who believe that the lives and interest of animals mat-
ter, if not always to human beings, then to the animals 
themselves . Animal advocates support the reduction or 
elimination of pain, suffering, abuse, and neglect, as 
in 2013 spent $56 billion on their animals, according to 
the American Pet Products Association .14 Similar studies 
on what owners spend on their animals for each type of 
companion animal could provide useful estimates for how 
owners value their companion animals and form a basis for 
measuring damages for their lost companionship .
Finally, contingent valuation methodology may be used 
to survey companion animal owners and ask what mon-
etary value they would place on their companion animal . 
Note that although behavioral and contingent valuation 
methods here will reflect average values and thus do not 
reflect the precise value of the animal to the individual 
owner in any specific case, the cost of such inaccuracy is 
offset by the benefit of providing an objective, nonspecula-
tive approach that cabins the damages awarded and pro-
vides notice to potential defendants .
I think that the next step in the animal law debate is 
to appreciate and compensate for the intrinsic value of all 
owned animals, based on these lessons from environmen-
tal law . Under current law, the value of an owned animal 
is a function of their use to their human owner . A rabbit, 
for example, will be valued differently if she’s raised for 
food, used for experimentation, or treasured as a compan-
ion to the human owner . This result promotes the com-
pensatory goal of damages—to make the human owner 
whole—over the regulatory goal—to protect the rabbit’s 
interest in not being harmed . In fact, damages or sanc-
tions for an owner’s harm to an animal must include the 
animal’s intrinsic value to set a proper regulatory floor to 
avoid harm to the animal .
Arguably, this may be already captured to some degree 
under the Animal Welfare Act when setting civil and 
criminal penalties assessed against owners for violation of 
the animal welfare act regulations, although I don’t believe 
the quantification to date is accurate or that it is actively 
enforced . Under common law, allowing the owner to 
recover for the intrinsic value of the animal arguably gives 
a windfall to the owner because it exceeds the owner’s use 
value of the animal . But successful plaintiffs in all types of 
litigation typically receive restitution or punitive damages, 
which arguably are windfalls for these plaintiffs in order to 
serve other public policy goals . On the other hand, one can 
argue that intrinsic damages are not really a windfall at all 
because the burden of proof of damages is on the plaintiff; 
measurement of compensatory damages is imprecise; and 
the plaintiff typically bears the cost of litigation, and thus 
it is proper for the owner to retain damages representing 
intrinsic value of the animal .
Alternatively, jurisdictions could place the damages rep-
resenting the animal’s intrinsic value into a fund to pro-
mote animals’ interests in a similar manner as when they 
place punitive damages into a fund for future tort victims . 
The fund for animals established from the intrinsic value 
14 . Americans Spent a Record 56 Billion on Pets Last Year, CBS Moneywatch, 
Mar . 13, 2014, http://www .cbsnews .com/news/americans-spent-a-record- 
56-billion-on-pets-last-year/ .
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well as eliminating the exploitation and unnecessary 
death of animals .15
There’s not a lot there to disagree with . The devil is 
always in the details, but that’s pretty straightforward lan-
guage . That’s how a lot of folks who do animal protection 
work think about it .
Anyone here who has worked at the overlap between 
animal law and environmental law is probably familiar 
in one form or another with the traditional narrative that 
these are two movements that have very different people 
with very different ideas trying to do very different things, 
and that there’s not a lot of compatibility . Perhaps histori-
cally that’s been the case . But based on the show of hands 
we just saw, things may be trending a little differently now, 
especially with millennials and the new generation .
Are the differences between environmentalists and 
animal protectionists truly irreconcilable? Whether you 
compromise or you’re an absolutist, are you willing to 
do things in an incremental way? There are folks who do 
animal protection work who would view working hand-
in-hand with environmentalists as some form of compro-
mise, as not staying true to their values . And the reverse, 
of course, is also true for many environmentalists . Per-
haps the biggest single perceived barrier is the idea of the 
ecosystem versus the individual . Joan really drove this 
home: the notion that on the one hand we care about the 
environment and ecosystem relationships; on the other 
hand, we care about an individual animal and his or her 
well-being . These sometimes feel like incompatible pref-
erences . There is a tension .
Politics also is a tricky issue when it comes to animals 
and the environment . In many ways, the animal law or ani-
mal protection movement manages to be more bipartisan, 
or is perceived as more bipartisan overall, than the environ-
mental movement . I will put in a plug for the Environmen-
tal Law Institute as a place that manages to be bipartisan 
and to bring everybody under the same tent . But this politi-
cal tension is important because, for example, if you see 
yourself as part of an effort on the animal law side that’s 
doing very nicely on Capitol Hill and in statehouses around 
the country, maybe you want to be a little cautious about 
working with environmentalists, depending on your issues . 
Environmental protection in 2015 carries political baggage .
Again, some of these are stereotypes . But let’s get them 
out on the table, because there is some truth to them, 
right? The environmental movement has come to iden-
tify itself with the appeal to science . Good science, doing 
good science, is key . For example, the Clean Water Rule 
jointly promulgated by the U .S . Environmental Protec-
tion Agency and the U .S . Army Corps of Engineers pur-
suant to the Clean Water Act (CWA)16 may be politically 
(and for many, legally) controversial, but the agencies 
15 . Joyce Tischler & Bruce Myers, Animal Protection and Environmentalism:The 
Time Has Come to Be More Than Just Friends, in What Can Animal Law 
Learn From Environmental Law?, supra note 1, at 389 .
16 . 33 U .S .C . §§1251-1387, ELR Stat . FWPCA §§101-607 .
invested substantial time and effort grounding it in peer-
reviewed science .17
With environmental law, we can and do debate what 
the science is and who’s right and who’s wrong about the 
answers, but the arguments are typically grounded in sci-
ence . Traditionally, animal protection is grounded more 
in emotion, but that foundation is changing a bit . Animal 
protection and animal law are now moving more toward 
scientific claims and scientific appeal .
But just think of the Sarah McLachlan commercial, 
the angel commercial for the ASPCA . Do you not tear 
up when that comes on? Most people change the chan-
nel because it’s so hard to watch . I know I do . This isn’t to 
say that environmentalists don’t play to emotions as well . 
The environmental movement does and should and will 
continue to do so, but nonetheless that science-versus-emo-
tion tension is viewed by some as a kind of divide between 
movements . I’m going to touch briefly on some issue-spe-
cific differences . 
Agriculture: There is a tension between the movements 
when it comes to agriculture and greenhouse gas emissions 
associated with agricultural operations . There’s the notion 
of consumption . There’s this sense that maybe we all agree 
that we want to do more to mitigate emissions, but per-
haps from an animal perspective, we should all be vegans 
or vegetarians, right? Environmentalists often disagree . 
Reducing consumption of meat and dairy products thus 
becomes a point of tension, despite substantial agreement 
that something needs to be done on that aspect of green-
house gas emissions . In any event, animal organizations are 
leading the charge on lawsuits aimed at reducing emissions 
attributable to animal agriculture .
Hunting and Trapping and Fishing: These are pretty obvi-
ous areas of significant difference between the movements .
Invasive Species: This presents perhaps the hardest case, 
seeming to call for that quintessential choice between the 
ecosystem and the individual . It’s kill all the nutria and 
save the ecosystem; or it’s save the nutria and what happens 
to the ecosystem happens to the ecosystem . It’s the feral 
cats that are killing the songbirds . Which side should we be 
on? These are perhaps the hardest cases at the intersection 
of animal issues and environmental issues .
But another way of looking at this is to focus on the 
many commonalities between the two movements . We’ve 
got substantive areas of shared interest . For example, the 
food system and industrial agriculture: The polluting 
effects associated with our current system of food produc-
tion in this country are centered around intensive confine-
ment of animals . There is a lot for animal law to do there 
and for animal advocates to be concerned with . The same 
goes for environmental advocates and environmental law .
Species Extinction and Threatened and Endangered 
Animals: This area poses major concerns at both the spe-
cies and individual levels . There are straightforward areas 
17 . 80 Fed . Reg . 37053 (June 29, 2015) . See also U .S . EPA, Connectivity of 
Streams and Wetlands to Downstream Waters: A Review and Syn-
thesis of the Scientific Evidence, EPA/600/R-14/475F (2015) .
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of overlap between the two movements . Similarly, with 
native predators such as wolves, coyotes . These are issues 
on which many environmental advocates are going to agree 
with many animal advocates .
Chemical Regulation and Toxicity Testing: I’ve worked 
with Joyce and some of our other colleagues on issues sur-
rounding much-needed reform of the Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TSCA),18 which has been a priority for many 
environmentalists and environmental lawyers . Underlying 
it is the actual scientific system that we use to do toxicity 
testing and determine the risks associated with different 
chemical compounds . There is a scientific wave coming 
through that is cresting now and looks at in-vitro and com-
puter testing as opposed to using whole animal tests . So, 
when you look at animal testing, which is a major issue for 
animal protectionists, and you look at reforming our major 
toxics control law, which is a priority on the environmental 
side, you can see potential future overlap as the new testing 
systems come on line . However, there are some tensions 
there as well .
Next, the two movements must grapple with similar 
legal hurdles—although they bring to bear dissimilar legal 
toolboxes . The environmental movement has numerous 
federal environmental laws and its own federal environ-
mental agency; it has citizen suits; and it has a history of 
common-law nuisance on which to build . Environmental-
ists have all these powerful tools . Animal law chiefly has, 
well, the Animal Welfare Act, which is extremely limited . 
The institutional and legal tools available to the environ-
mental movement are in some sense the envy of the animal 
law movement . Yet, at the same time, there’s a recognition 
that environmental law has hit middle age, it’s in its 40s 
and trying to figure out what comes next . Are we doing all 
we can environmentally about climate change, about non-
point source water pollution? Do we even have the tools 
for these crises? It’s not entirely clear that we do, revealing 
a similarity between the two movements, looking forward .
Article III Standing: That’s a challenge for all plaintiffs, 
to make a showing that they are properly in federal court . 
The strategy for making that showing has really developed 
in the crucible of environmental protection and environ-
mental law . Animal advocates in public interest litigation 
now struggle with standing issues all the time . Much time 
is spent on that issue .
Ensuring Public Access to Information: This is critically 
important to both movements . Both legal regimes benefit 
from being able to tell the public what’s actually going 
on, and why it’s going on, and having access to science 
and information to communicate those concerns . Both 
movements face certain barriers, legal and institutional, 
to being able to do so . I co-teach as an adjunct at Ameri-
can University Washington College of Law a course on 
agriculture and sustainability . It seems as if every week we 
come back in some fashion to transparency and secrecy 
and access to information for public participation . The 
problem of barriers to this opportunity to communicate 
18 . 15 U .S .C . §§2601-2692, ELR Stat . TSCA §§2-412 .
and encourage public participation is, unfortunately, an 
all-too-common one .
Practical Barriers Posed by Ideology and Industry: Many 
nonprofits and others doing public interest work in this 
space run into ideological and industry opposition . That’s 
not necessarily a bad thing . There are different ideologies, 
there are different views on the proper reach of regula-
tion and the proper scope of personal property rights . An 
antiregulation, pro-property-rights stance is not necessar-
ily intended to be anti-environment or anti-animal . The 
same holds true for a developer simply trying to secure 
permits for activities that can harm animals and the envi-
ronment . Yet, as a practical matter, it is a reality that these 
viewpoints cause major headwinds for environmentalists 
and animal protectionists .
Limited Resources: Certainly for all nonprofits, that’s an 
obvious one .
Internal Debates: How much do you compromise? Are 
you an incrementalist? Is it all or nothing? How much 
are you willing to get into bed with folks whose views 
you might not entirely share? Both movements have these 
internal debates . At times, it’s very easy to dismiss animal 
advocates and environmental advocates as being obstruc-
tionists, or as deploying the red tape, not really focusing 
on the things that matter . Effective communication, again, 
remains incredibly important for both of these areas .
Happily, there is some evidence that a generational shift 
is occurring . When I meet law students and recent law 
graduates at conferences or festivals like VegFest or Earth 
Day, there are a lot of people who now embrace and identify 
with both movements . Maybe they signed up with certain 
organizations, but they see themselves as being in all of it .
Ultimately, there is a special kinship between these two 
movements that are focused, at their core, on ensuring the 
protection of the nonhuman other . Something that’s got a 
property status . It’s not yours, but you really care about it . 
That’s a major similarity . It’s usually someone else’s property, 
and there is a bigger challenge when it’s privately owned 
instead of publicly owned . This similarity brings hope for 
merging the narratives . The movements are two peas in a 
pod, with similar purpose . Yet, one is angry because they’re 
not always on the same page . But hey, they’re in the same 
pod, so that’s a start .
Trends and Opportunities: There is enhanced and 
increased collaboration between the movements . It’s like 
being in a marriage . Whatever might be going wrong, 
you’ve just got to talk, you’ve got to keep communicating . 
Maybe we’re not big on communications, but it’s better 
than not communicating . On the subject of communica-
tion, there are numerous shared educational and research 
efforts going on across animal and environmental lines, a 
lot of shared initiatives in the public interest litigation space 
and the impact litigation space . Significant collaboration is 
already happening in many different ways, and from my 
perspective, happening at increasing levels .
A Shared Future: What are the goals that might be 
shared among ourselves? How do we frame that? In getting 
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there, we laid out some principles in our chapter . These 
include the mutual well-being of animals in the environ-
ment and people . Science has got to be in there . And you 
have to think about the economics . Sometimes, it may 
feel distasteful to value these things that are so priceless 
to us, but you just have to do it to be part of the conversa-
tion . Transparency and public engagement are critical . We 
think we’d be willing to accept incremental changes, but 
what does that look like? Agriculture and the food system 
are key: this is the poster child for overlap between animal 
law and environmental law, and between the environmen-
tal movement and the animal movement . It’s about people 
wanting to know more about their food and where it comes 
from and what was done in its production .
Institutional Structures and Legal Regimes: We have mul-
tiple federal agencies with environmental mandates . We 
don’t have the same strong animal mandates . Are there 
accommodations that can be made? Are there opportuni-
ties on the animal side, even being willing to have con-
versations about increased incremental rights involving 
resources or animals—without everyone getting very upset 
that this is an “animal rights” conversation and we’re all 
going to shut down? Being willing to talk openly and hon-
estly about how existing legal structures are failing our 
animals and our environment is part of this shared future .
Randall Abate: We’re ready for audience questions now . 
This one’s for Joan: It seems that you were talking about 
how to do valuations for animals in a tort sense . I think for 
some people in the room, the connection there might’ve 
been clearer . Could you expand on how changing the way 
we value animals in tort cases could affect the movement 
in a broader sense? Or am I mischaracterizing your thesis?
Joan Schaffner: It’s true that the current animal-law dam-
ages debate is primarily in the torts context and involves 
only companion animals—which is arguably narrow and 
appears as if it’s all about compensating the owner and not 
about protecting the animal . However, the focus on prop-
erly valuing companion animals in the tort context also 
promotes greater protection for the animal, as the damages 
will better reflect the value of the animal and in turn estab-
lish a higher standard of care for third parties, such as pet 
products and pet food manufacturers, veterinarians, and 
others . So, within the tort context, the idea of setting dam-
ages that would recognize the full value, and particularly 
the companionship value of a companion animal, is going 
to not only help the owner, but also serve the interests of 
the individual animals by creating an incentive of care for 
all these various industries that affect animals .
Moreover, what I suggest is that this relatively narrow 
focus on seeking companionship value for injury to a com-
panion animal ultimately will promote all animals’ inter-
ests . First, it sets the stage to recognize that all animals 
have noneconomic value . I think that when the law rec-
ognizes that pet cats and dogs have companionship value 
and that folks now have pigs and other types of animals as 
pets, then the law will start recognizing and viewing ani-
mals as something other than personal property with only 
economic value; in other words, animals are more than 
mere economic commodities . Second, and more broadly, 
the idea is that if we start recognizing that animals have 
other than use value but also have intrinsic value, this will 
provide for greater legal protection for all animals, inde-
pendent of their use by humans .
For example, the rabbit I mentioned doesn’t have a dif-
ferent intrinsic value just because she is living in someone’s 
home versus being used for research or raised for food . The 
rabbit has intrinsic value, which in turn sets the floor with 
respect to the care that we should give that rabbit, no matter 
where the rabbit lives or how the rabbit is used . Ultimately, 
if the intrinsic value of an animal is set appropriately, many 
of our current uses of animals will be deemed improper, 
because the benefits to humans of their use will not exceed 
the harm/cost to the animal .
My hope is that we start importing, not only within the 
tort or common-law context, but also within the legisla-
tive statutory framework, an understanding of the intrinsic 
value of these animals such that we set the standards higher 
to give greater protection to all animals .
Audience Member: My question builds on that question, 
and I’m open to anyone’s thoughts on this . I definitely agree 
about the separation between the animal and environmental 
movements . I’m in the environmental camp . I think a big 
separation that environmentalists see is that domesticated 
animals, at least, are kind of separate from the ecosystem . 
They’ve been removed from it and, therefore, the effects on 
it are not as much as if you remove a keystone species . But 
one success of the environmental movement through sci-
ence, maybe through ecosystem services valuation, has been 
to look at how much value bees or bats or sharks give to 
the environment, to farmers . They’ve found a number . For 
example, Bat Conservation International has found num-
bers in the billions of dollars of how much money bats save 
farmers . I don’t know if this is possible from the opposite 
standpoint or if anyone has done this kind of work to look 
at how much total negative effect the CAFOs have had on 
the environment and maybe to use that argument as a way 
to oppose CAFOs rather than focusing on the welfare and 
suffering of the cows . I believe that the use of science either 
way is beneficial to both movements .
Bruce Myers: People are thinking about that and are doing 
it; it’s important from a communications perspective and, 
frankly, it’s just important . One of the issues when it comes 
to CAFOs and food production is what is often described 
as the true cost of food as opposed to the cost of food that 
you pay at the cash register . For example, to what extent 
are there externalized impacts from the nontherapeutic use 
of antibiotics and potential antibiotic resistance, and from 
groundwater pollution, surface water pollution, and local-
ized air pollution?
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If you’re protective of animal welfare, that, too, would 
pose an increased cost . All of these costs (and I’m using a 
very broad brush here) are externalized to the extent that 
these things can be valued and you find out there’s a price 
being paid . You may not be paying it at the register, but 
it’s being paid societally . It’s being paid with the dead zone 
in the Gulf of Mexico, which is due in significant part, 
although not exclusively, to agriculture . People are think-
ing about and working on those issues, and that is a point 
of focus because it resonates with people beyond the senti-
ments of “save the animals” and “save the environment .”
One other quick thing: You made the initial point about 
seeing companion animals as being separate . I think it’s a 
fair point that if you drew a Venn diagram with two circles 
representing animal protection and environmental protec-
tion, there’s a lot of overlap, but there are certainly things 
that are not directly related . You can argue over where the 
lines are, but I think that’s right . It’s not a perfect set of 
concentric circles, so that’s a fair point .
Liz Hallinan: There are groups that are bringing CWA 
lawsuits against CAFOs . In that case, even if the plain-
tiffs wanted to argue for the intrinsic value of the animals 
inside the CAFO, it’s just not contemplated by the CWA . 
So, there are animal groups bringing environmental suits 
where the only argument they can make is to the intrinsic 
value of the water outside the CAFO .
Randall Abate: One theme that runs through the book 
is that this is an opportunity where linking a problem like 
CAFOs to humans rather than looking at it as an animal 
welfare problem can go much further in many ways . I think 
the documentary Cowspiracy did a good job of conveying 
the environmental impact from CAFOs . That’s going to 
get more attention from people than, “oh, those poor ani-
mals,” and the public health implications are significant 
as well in terms of the impacts of the use of antibiotics 
in meat production and the impacts of a meat-based diet . 
Ultimately, if it’s harmful to humans, we’re likely going 
to care more . That’s the latest thing we’ve inherited from 
the environmental movement, that it wasn’t our crusade to 
protect rivers for their own sake or air for its own sake that 
was successful . It was because pollution of those resources 
was having profound impacts on human health that the 
environmental movement really took off . I think that’s a 
really valuable lesson from which animal law can learn .
Joan Schaffner: Prof . David Favre, during a workshop 
this past weekend, said we should refer to ourselves as 
animalists . So, we’ve got environmentalists, and we’ve 
got animalists .
The theme raised by the question is that environmen-
talists should focus on the benefits to humans as a way 
of gaining greater protection for the animals . I think part 
of the reason animalists are focused more on companion 
animals is the linkage between animal harm and human 
harm; for example, the link between animal cruelty and 
violence against humans . It’s a way to incentivize going 
after people who harm animals because those same people 
will harm or are harming humans . In the end, the animals 
gain greater protection, but the incentive to provide greater 
protection is rooted in protecting human interests .
Also, companion animals are the animals with whom 
we connect . If we focus within the companion animal 
framework first to achieve protections, we set the stage for 
protecting other animals once we recognize that there’s not 
that much difference between our pet cat and dog and the 
pig on the farm or the deer in Rock Creek Park in D .C . But 
when you have a connection with the animal, you’re much 
more interested and willing to protect and value him/her . 
So, we start by valuing and protecting our companions and 
then extend this interest to other animals .
Bruce Myers: I’m thinking of invasive species . They create 
an uneasy tension between the two movements, particu-
larly when it comes to control . When it comes to preven-
tion, though, there’s actually a lot of agreement between 
the movements . Everybody agrees that to the extent we can 
prevent the arrival of invasive, non-native species, that’s a 
good thing . We find some overlap among environmental 
and animal NGOs in that prevention space .
Joan Schaffner: I actually think there is some agreement 
even in the area of “control .” I don’t know if people are 
aware of the feral cat issue here in D .C . The D .C . Depart-
ment of Energy and Environment drafted a report pro-
posing that D .C . revisit their trap-neuter-release (TNR) 
program because the feral, e .g ., free-roaming, community 
cats allegedly are harming some of the native species here . 
The agency said that instead of the TNR program it would 
just round up the cats and place them in adoption facili-
ties . Anyone who understands feral cats understands that’s 
not going to work because the shelters will just kill them 
all since they are not socialized to humans and thus cannot 
be “adopted .” All of us animalists got upset at the environ-
mentalists, and it seems like there’s this disconnect .
However, we all agree we don’t want millions of feral cats 
running around D .C . The disconnect concerns the manner 
by which we’re going to control the cats (or the deer for 
that matter) not whether they should be controlled . TNR 
is designed to reduce the number of community free-roam-
ing cats, which is the environmentalists’ goal, just as using 
contraceptive methods for the Rock Creek deer is designed 
to reduce the number of deer and protect all animals in 
the District . The disconnect is that the animalists promote 
humane nonlethal methods rather than the lethal methods 
often proposed by the environmentalists .
Randall Abate: Do any of the panelists think that the ani-
mal rights movement will or can use the public trust doc-
trine to limit private rights to exploit animals?
Liz Hallinan: We’re trying . There are several groups that 
I’ve worked with that are trying to use that doctrine . Peo-
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ple are trying, but it’s a difficult doctrine to use for reasons 
I don’t fully understand .
Randall Abate: I had contracted a chapter on that topic for 
the book, but it didn’t come through . Another important 
chapter that didn’t come through would have addressed 
animal testing . Hopefully, we can get those authors on 
board for the second edition . Basically, the public trust 
doctrine adopts a kind of stewardship notion with respect 
to protection of resources . It’s grounded in the notion that, 
for example, the wet sand areas of our coasts are held in 
trust by the state for the benefit of the people, so we don’t 
see private ownership of wet sands . That’s been the com-
mon-law tradition we inherited from England .
There’s now more of a connection of that notion to 
wildlife as well, not just limiting it to wet sands, but pub-
lic trust extending to water resources inland and to wild-
life that rely on those water resources, and most recently 
to a notion that’s known as atmospheric trust litigation, 
which provides that the states are custodians of the atmo-
sphere within the state and they have a duty to protect the 
integrity of the atmosphere for the benefit of the people . 
There are certainly opportunities for using this theory as 
a way to protect animals in addition to the environment 
they inhabit .
Bruce Myers: Touching on part of the premise of the ques-
tion, I think there was a reference to animal rights . I think 
the shorthand for animalists is usually animal rights, and 
there are a lot of gradations . I typically speak in terms of 
animal protection, which can represent either the entire 
spectrum or the middle range . At one end, there’s animal 
welfare . At the other end, there’s a more robust animal 
rights scheme where certain animals have enforceable legal 
rights in court, or some person whose status is of whatever 
sort is necessary for standing .
Randall Abate: A trustee .
Bruce Myers: A trustee, exactly . There are different 
f lavors of this . I personally support some version of 
this . It’s an important area of nuance underlying our 
larger conversation .
Audience Member: I have a couple of comments . You 
were talking about how the animal welfare or animal rights 
movement needs to be brought more into the conversation . 
I think they’re trying, but there are also hurdles like ag-gag 
laws and the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA)19 
to overcome . I also wanted to mention statistics about the 
horrors of CAFOs and trying to bridge the gap between 
the environmental movement and the animal rights move-
ment . I also have a comment to Liz about going local with 
the movement . I just got back from Massachusetts . There’s 
a ballot initiative there to ban inhumane cages and crates .
19 . Pub . L . No . 109-374 .
Liz Hallinan: Yes, we’re very excited .
Bruce Myers: I’m glad that you mentioned ag-gag laws 
because they are where a lot of this comes together in the 
food and CAFO context, where environmental issues and 
animal issues converge . For those who are not familiar 
with ag-gag laws, they are state laws (I think there are 6-10 
of them actually on the books, but many more have been 
introduced around the country over the years and have not 
succeeded) that criminalize the act of providing recorded 
information without the permission of an agricultural 
facility owner .20 Typically, this information has taken the 
form of investigative videos that have shown clear animal 
abuse in agricultural settings . You’re aware of them; you’ve 
seen them . A response to these videos has, to the surprise 
of many, often been: let’s criminalize the ability to get this 
information out, which absolutely runs against the funda-
mental view of transparency and public participation for 
environmentalists . And for animalists, it’s like, hey, we’re 
showing you the reality of what’s happening—and we’re 
the bad guys?
There are variations in these state ag-gag laws . For 
example, they limit the ability to record something and 
publish it without the permission of the facility owner, or 
to be hired under false pretenses if you’re really an inves-
tigative reporter or someone who wants to do this to find 
wrongdoing . Some of the laws provide that you have to 
report any wrongdoing you found within 24 to 48 hours 
because that’s helpful for law enforcement . But you think, 
wait a minute, how many long-term drug stings can you 
immediately report within 24 hours? The idea is that you 
want to be immersed for some period of time and be able 
to get information . Ag-gag laws and the AETA are an 
important space at the nexus of the animal and environ-
mental movements .
Liz Hallinan: This would be the first topic on what can 
environmental law learn from animal law . Wyoming 
recently passed a version of this law and it wasn’t because 
of an animal investigation . It was because of, I think, the 
CWA or water pollution . So, now in Wyoming you can’t 
go on to certain lands and collect water data, you can’t test 
the waters, because the industry in Wyoming is worried 
that that data will be used against them in court .21
Audience Member: Another separation that comes up 
sometime is veganism for all, veganism for the world . The 
first of the contrasts was livelihoods and impoverished 
20 . For more on ag-gag laws, see Lewis Bollard, Ag-Gag: The Constitutionality 
of Laws Restricting Undercover Investigations on Farms, 42 ELR 10960 (Mar . 
2012) . See also ASPCA, Ag-Gag Legislation by State, https://www .aspca .
org/animal-protection/public-policy/ag-gag-legislation-state .
21 . See Western Watersheds Project v . Michael, No . 15-CV-169, 46 ELR 20023 
(D . Wyo . Dec . 28, 2015) (environmental and animal rights groups’ lawsuit 
survived motion to dismiss in case challenging the constitutionality of two 
trespass statutes, one civil and one criminal, that allegedly prevented them 
from collecting and submitting data relating to land and land use to gov-
ernmental agencies, as they had done in the past in efforts to protect and 
advocate for animals and the environment) .
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nations or communities that rely solely on fish for protein or 
something like that . So, right now, until we get to the true 
cost of food, which we haven’t gotten to yet—true cost of 
the environment, true cost of animals—what do you think 
about that argument that the whole world should go vegan? 
How much advantage or disadvantage does it bring to the 
movement? The recent incidents of PETA, for example, tell-
ing some of the Detroit residents that if they go vegan then 
PETA would pay their water bill, obviously generated some 
backlash . Where do you stand on that and how viable an 
approach do you think that is for the world or for Americans 
based on livelihoods and income inequality?
Randall Abate: Something we haven’t had an opportunity 
to get into is the international dimensions of these issues . 
We have a member of the audience, Sabine Brels, who 
authored Chapter 15 in this book . She is the co-founder of 
the Global Animal Law Project, and is an active advocate 
of global veganism as a way of addressing these issues .
Sabine Brels: As a United Nations report22 said, it’s a 
direction to go to be more environmentalist, to be more 
humanist, to fight against world hunger and thirst and 
pollution, and to be also more animalist . It’s more about 
this huge meat overconsumption and overproduction than 
about the local communities who rely only on fish to sur-
vive in a small neighborhood in lesser developed countries . 
It’s now the biggest impact . The priority now is if we want 
to save the world or have the chance to limit the crash we’re 
rushing toward, we should consume less, produce less, and 
encourage less overdestruction of nature, the animals, and 
the humans themselves .
With human problems, I think we have all the scientific 
data now and all the conclusions to know what is the best 
path forward . For now, it’s still a question of individual 
morals, whereas it should be a global political concern . So, 
yes, for the moment, it’s the direction to go . It’s a way every-
one can go as far as we have with more incentive politically 
and economically, and also more awareness about all the 
problems out there being interconnected, and how we can 
do our best to move on to a better future .
Randall Abate: Next question: Can the panel point to any 
environmental law section within the state bar associations 
or law organizations that has worked closely with an ani-
mal law section? Is there synergy within the bar? And if so, 
what came from those partnerships?
Bruce Myers: It’s been my experience that the animal law 
section often exists within the broader environmental law 
section . The animalists can take issue with that, if you like, 
but that’s typically where it is . Certainly, that’s the case in 
Washington, D .C . However, I spoke on a panel a number 
22 . United Nations Environment Programme, Assessing the Environ-
mental Impacts of Consumption and Production (2010), http://www .
unep .org/resourcepanel/Portals/24102/PDFs/PriorityProductsAndMateri-
als_Report .pdf .
of years ago in Louisiana for an animal law section that I 
think was a freestanding section within the state bar asso-
ciation . Some of the animal bar sections and committees 
are quite active . You can find them, and related resources, 
online without too much trouble .
Joan Schaffner: I have to make a plug for the American 
Bar Association (ABA) . I think we are somewhat unique 
in this regard . The Animal Law Committee resides in the 
Tort Trial and Insurance Practice Section of the ABA . The 
Environment, Energy, and Resources Section of the ABA 
has an endangered species committee, but that is the only 
committee focused on animals . The Science and Technol-
ogy Law Section has a committee on animals and research, 
but their focus is not on protecting the animals in research; 
it’s more focused on issues that relate to our use of animals 
in research . But in the Tort Trial and Insurance Practice 
Section, we look at all the various issues related to animals 
and the law . In contrast, I think that in D .C . and other 
state bars, the animal law committees are often found in 
the environmental sections with several states now having 
established stand-alone animal law sections, which I think 
is wonderful .
Liz Hallinan: My comment is not about bar associations, 
but that I’m starting to see a cross-pollination where indi-
vidual environmentally trained lawyers will go work for an 
animal group or vice versa . What that means is that inside 
public interest groups, you will get prodding toward either 
more environmental or more animal work . For example, I 
know someone who wanted to focus on animal work within 
the Natural Resources Defense Council and so she spear-
headed their farmed animal antibiotics campaign . As an 
insider at an environmental group, she could say, hey, you 
should care about animal production . Additionally, the ani-
mal groups are starting to pick up on environmental claims 
and bringing in people who had done environmental law in 
law school to figure out how to use environmental laws to 
promote animal interests . I see this as an employment-based 
move toward cross-pollination and collaboration between 
the environmental and animal movements .
Randall Abate: Bruce made reference to a generational 
shift . One thing that I’m seeing in academia is that the 
vast majority of the students who are in the Environmental 
Law Society are also in the Student Animal Legal Defense 
Fund . I’m currently on a book tour for this book, and 
virtually all the schools that have hosted me have jointly 
hosted the talk between the Environmental Law Society 
and the Student Animal Legal Defense Fund, perhaps in 
part because of the title of the book, but also because there 
is a growing awareness of the interconnections between 
these movements . It’s the new generation of lawyers that 
can really tighten those links .
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